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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Since Foucaull 's death in 19K4, his interpreters have generally 
located his importance in his genealogical critiques and in his phi-
losophy ofpower. On the one hand, Foucault performs genealogical 
critiques of the practices surrounding modern punishment and sex, 
and on the other hand, his genealogies alert us to the dangers of 
new forms ofpower. However, the exact nature of the relationship 
between his genealogical critiques and his views on power remains 
a matter of dispute, for Foucault neither expressly states a program 
of critique, nor clearly articulates an account of power. The pur-
pose of this paper, then, is to establish the relationship between the 
critical force of Foucault 's genealogy and his views power. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. In the first part, I 
elaborate the prominent objection that the critical force of Foucault 's 
genealogies is undermined by his notion of power. In the second 
part, I reconstruct Foucault 's account of power in considerable 
detail, and clarify the 'strategical mode l ' o f p o w e r which informs 
his genealogical critiques. In the third part, I establish the critical 
force of his genealogy by distinguishing two stages of genealogi-
cal critique. Finally, I respond to the objection against Foucault 
and conclude that his account of power does not undermine his 
genealogical critiques, but rather provides them with radical criti-
cal force and ultimately leads to a novel reconceptualization of 
ethics. 
2. T h e Case Against Foucau l t 
Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer all deny 
that Foucauldian genealogy is critical. 1 More specifically, they ar-
gue that Foucaul l ' s understanding of cr i t ique is contradictory, 
incoherent, and nihilistic primarily for reasons tied to his views on 
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power. Habermas, then, also speaks for Taylor and Walzer when 
he says that 'the entire weight of the problematic [of Foucault's 
critique] rests on the basic concept of power.'2 In this section I 
simply want to elaborate the objections of each critic, focusing on 
the putatively problematic relationship between critique and power. 
Habermas's position on Foucauldian genealogy and critique is 
introduced in his eulogy of Foucault, 'Taking Aim at the Heart of 
the Present,' 3 and elaborated in Lectures IX and X of Der 
philosophische Diskurs der Moderne.* Habermas's basic objection 
is that Foucault is guilty of a performative contradiction; as he 
concisely remarks in the eulogy, Foucault 'contrasts his critique of 
power with the "analysis of truth" in such a fashion that the former 
becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have 
to borrow from the latter.'5 In Der philosophische Diskurs der 
Moderne, Habermas expands on this objection by distinguishing 
three constitutive claims. First, Habermas claims that Foucault's 
early archaeological analysis of discourses denies the possibility 
of objective, universal truth, and so amounts to relativism. Sec-
ondly, he claims that critique requires standards, and that standards 
ultimately derive their normative justification only from univer-
sa l . Lastly, and this is the thrust of his objection, he claims that 
Foucault's late critique of certain forms of power is both illegiti-
mate because its standards lack normative justification, and also 
contradictory because it presupposes an epistemic validity his analy-
ses of discourses attempt to refute. In other words, Foucault's 
analyses of discourses render truth a function of regimes of power 
and consequently undermine his critique of certain forms of power 
simply because that critique has no recourse to normative stan-
dards the epistemic validity of which is not itself a function of 
power. Put simply, Foucault's attempt at critique is not only ille-
gitimate and contradictory, but also hopelessly self-referential. Thus, 
Habermas concludes that Foucault adopts a position 'of arbitrary 
partisanship of criticism [and] cannot account for its normative 
foundations.'6 In a word, Foucault ultimately fails to provide 'a 
normative justification for critique.'7 
Like Habermas, Taylor argues that Foucault is guilty of a simi-
lar performative contradiction, but he draws a different conclusion 
from that contradiction than does Habermas. According to Taylor, 
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Foucault's genealogies 'seem to offer an insight into what has hap-
pened, and into what we have become, which at the same time 
offers a critique, and hence some notion of a good unrealized or 
repressed in history, which we therefore understand better how to 
rescue.'8 Taylor suggests that two goods implicit in Foucault's work 
and in need of rescue are freedom and truth. However, Foucault is 
said to reject these two and all such goods; while 'Foucault's analy-
ses seem to bring evils to light...he wants to distance himself from 
the suggestion which would seem inescapably to follow, that the 
negation or overcoming of these evils promotes a good.' 9 More 
specifically, Foucault's critique of power rejects both truth because 
each system of power 'defines its own variant of truth,' and also 
freedom because 'there is no escape from power into freedom.' 1 0 
So given Taylor's claims that '"power" belongs to a semantic field 
from which "truth" and "freedom" cannot be excluded,' 1 1 and that 
Foucault's 'notion of power....[rejects] the correlative notions of 
truth and liberation,'12 it follows that 'Foucault's position is ulti-
mately incoherent.'13 In short, Foucault's genealogical critique of 
specific forms of power simply makes no sense independently of 
the notions truth and liberation rejected by his account of power. 
Walzer's objection to Foucault's genealogical critique draws 
out the extreme implications of Habermas's and Taylor's accusa-
tions of relativism, for Walzer argues that Foucault's relativism 
leads him to moral and political anarchism, and ultimately to nihil-
ism. Walzer begins by making the now familiar point that for 
Foucault truth is a function of regimes of power. As Walzer puts it, 
Foucault 'believes that truth is relative to its sanctions and knowl-
edge to the constraints that produce it.' 1 4 Consequently, Walzer 
continues, 'there would appear to be no independent standpoint...for 
the development of critical principles.'15 This point about the va-
lidity of critical standards is also made by both Habermas and 
Taylor, but Walzer takes it farther. Walzer maintains that Foucault's 
lack of valid critical standards means that he can provide 'no prin-
cipled distinction...between the Gulag and the carceral 
archipelagos,' a distinction Walzer rightly wants to preserve. 1 6 
Moreover, because Foucault does not 'give us any way of know-
ing what "better" might mean,' Foucault's ostensible critique of 
certain forms of power and his call for resistance against certain 
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strategies of power are not reformatory or revolutionary, but rather 
morally and politically anarchistic. That is, because Foucault has 
no normative standards or commitments, his critique cannot be 
intended to somehow improve society, but instead attempts to abol-
ish carceral society and the very notion of society as a system of 
institutions. Walzer then concludes that Foucault's radical aboli-
tionism is nihilistic because unlike nineteenth-century anarchists 
for whom human subjects were liberated and edified by the ab-
sence of (political or economic) institutions, Foucault believes that 
human subjectivity is the product of practical and institutional sys-
tems of power such that after the elimination of those systems 'there 
will be nothing left at all, nothing visibly human.' 1 7 For Walzer, 
then, Foucauldian genealogy lacks normative standards of critique, 
and this lack condemns Foucault to relativism, anarchism, and ul-
timately nihilism. 
To sum up, Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer contend that Fou-
cault is a relativist, anarchist, and/or nihilist whose understanding 
of critique is contradictory and/or incoherent. Foucault does not 
and cannot provide a normative justification for any standard of 
critique, whatever that standard may be. Furthermore, all three crit-
ics attribute Foucault's lack of valid standards to epistemological 
problems endemic to his account of power; because truth is a func-
tion of power, there is no truth external to systems of power which 
can ground normative standards required to critique those systems 
and certain practices within them. Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer 
recognize the brilliance of Foucault's genealogies of power, pun-
ishment, and sex, but all three deny that those genealogies are 
critical. Whatever his intentions may be and whatever his rhetoric 
may suggest, Foucauldian genealogy is simply not critical. 
3. Foucault on Power 
In January 1976, only months before the publication of La 
volonte de savoir, Foucault delivered two untitled lectures at the 
College de France.18 The topic of the first 'Cows' is critique, the 
topic of the second is power, and as their juxtaposition suggests, 
critique and power are indeed fundamentally related. These lec-
tures and Foucault's subsequent works make clear that genealogy 
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presupposes a certain account of power and critiques specific forms 
of power. Thus, the most pressing question about the critical force 
of Foucauldian genealogy concerns the account of power that in-
forms it: according to Foucault, what exactly is power? 
There is no denying that Foucault develops an account of power, 
and one preliminary point about his account is that it does not con-
stitute a theory. In a 1983 interview, Foucault makes this point 
explicit; 'I am far from being a theoretician of power,' he insists, 'I 
am not developing a theory of power' (DE IV:451). Whereas a 
theory of power implies an ontology and would require an expla-
nation of why power exists, Foucault's account of power is 
exclusively concerned with describing and analyzing how power 
functions. Furthermore, as Dreyfus and Rabinow observe, 
Foucault's account of power is in fact opposed to a theory of 
power. 1 9 Theories intend to be abstract and ahistorical explana-
tions, while Foucault's account of power is relentlessly concrete 
and historical. 
More substantively, Foucault's account of power consists of 
three parts: an analytics of power, a methodology of power, and a 
model of power. 2 0 First, Foucault performs an 'analytics of power 
[analytique dupouvoir]* in Surveiller etpunir and the Histoire de 
la sexualite. His analytics of power consists of interpretative analy-
ses of the conditions, strategies, mechanisms, and effects of power. 
Secondly, in the 1976 lectures and La volonte de savoir Foucault 
raises specific methodological concerns that guide his analytics of 
power. Lastly, in La volonte de savoir and 'The Subject and Power' 
Foucault articulates a model of power implicit in his analytics of 
power and anticipated by his methodological considerations about 
it. My task in the remainder of this section is to develop the second 
and third parts of Foucault's account of power in an attempt to 
illuminate the notion of power at the heart of his genealogical cri-
tique of punishment and sex. 
Foucault's methodological concerns about his analytics of 
power are introduced in the 1976 lectures. In the first lecture, Fou-
cault forms a taxonomy of influential conceptions of power and 
motivates his analytics of power by considering their inadequa-
cies. According to Foucault, the two dominant conceptions of power 
are those of liberalism and Marxism. The liberal conception of 
6 AUSLEGUNG 
power sees power as a right that is possessed, used, and transferred 
like a commodity, while the Marxist conception of power sees power 
as forces of production which maintain relations of production and 
class domination. Foucault argues that both conceptions understand 
power solely in economic terms, and that where right is concerned 
they narrowly focus on the distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate uses of power. Moreover, Foucault objects to the 
liberal-Marxist conception because its cumulative effect is to ob-
scure or distort non-economic relations of power and certain 
oppressive forms of it. 
Foucault is thus led to consider non-economic conceptions of 
power, those of Wilhelm Reich and Nietzsche. For Freud, Reich, 
and psychoanalytic theory generally, power is essentially repres-
sive; power represses nature, desires, individuals, and classes. For 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, power is a force exercised in warfare 
against other hostile forces. Foucault, though, recognizes that 
Reich's and Nietzsche's conceptions of power are compatible in-
sofar as repression is a consequence of war. Foucault then locates 
his own study of power in the tradition of Reich and Nietzsche, but 
at the end of the first lecture he expresses deep reservations about 
'the repressive hypothesis' that he believes is central to both, and 
that he will in fact argue against in the forthcoming La volonte de 
savoir. 
In contrast to the first lecture where he argues that liberalism, 
Marxism, Reich, and Nietzsche advance theories of power which 
mistakenly reify power,2 1 Foucault begins the second lecture by 
revealing the object of his own study of power; 'The research that 
I have tried to follow, roughly since 1970-1971, has been concerned 
with the "how" of power' (DE 111:175). Again, in opposition to 
these theories of power Foucault's analytics of power examines 
not 'what' power is, but rather 'how' power functions—the mani-
festations, mechanisms, strategies, and effects of relations of power. 
It is at this point that Foucault presents a list of five 'methodologi-
cal precautions' that guide his analytics of the 'how' of power, and 
these precautions deserve our attention not merely because they 
clarify his analytics of power, but also because they anticipate his 
strategical model of power. 
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The first methodological precaution observed by Foucault's 
analytics of power is that it focuses on the extreme and local points 
of the exercise of power, rather than on the embodiment of power 
in political sovereignty as the authority of right. Secondly, his 
analytics operates not at the level of human interiority, of individu-
als' conscious intentions or decisions, but at the level of the effects 
of power on (the constitution of) subjects. Thirdly, power is not to 
be understood as a thing which some individuals or groups possess 
and wield to dominate others, but as that which produces individu-
als and forms groups. Fourthly, Foucault avoids a deduction of 
power from its center to its smallest effects, and instead studies the 
ascent of power from the history and techniques of its smallest 
mechanisms to more global mechanisms and forms of domination. 
Lastly, the study of power cannot be confused with or reduced to 
the ideology associated with various forms of power, but must con-
sider the apparatuses of knowledge produced by power. 'In the 
study of power,' Foucault summarily concludes, 'we must renounce 
the model of power in Leviathan, namely its limited field of juridi-
cal sovereignty and State institutions. Instead, we must base our 
analysis of power on the techniques and tactics of domination' (DE 
111:184). 
The most important feature of this list of precautions, that is, 
the feature that most clarifies Foucault's analytics of power and 
most anticipates his model of power, concerns the field of inquiry 
and the task that the list defines. Foucault's analytics of power is 
limited to neither the power of political institutions nor the power-
lessness of individuals, but extends to and focuses on the detailed 
history of local relations of power which are ultimately respon-
sible for more global forms of domination. The purpose of 
Foucault's analytics of power is to document the development of 
local power relations into new and hidden forms of domination, 
and he is able to do so because his analytics of power presupposes 
a model of power which challenges the conventional understand-
ing of power, freedom, and domination. Foucault eventually 
articulates this model, but before we turn to it, two more method-
ological concerns remain. 
While Foucault initially raises methodological concerns about 
his analytics of power in the 1976 lectures he addresses two addi-
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tional concerns in Part Four of La volonte de savoir. First, Fou-
cault points out that an analytics of power requires a 'determination 
of the instruments that will make an analysis of power possible' 
(HS1 109). Again, Foucault's analytics of power consists of inter-
pretative analyses of power and delimits the field or domain on 
which such analyses are properly performed. In this remark, though, 
Foucault importantly adds that the analytics of power requires a 
certain conceptual apparatus in order to identify and analyze power, 
including its strategies, mechanisms, and effects. Moreover, 
Foucault's suggestion is that conventional notions about power, 
domination, violence, freedom, etc. are inadequate or in appropri-
ate to the task. As we are about to see, the requisite apparatus is 
supplied by Foucault's strategical model of power, and, more im-
mediately, the suggestion that conventional notions simply won't 
suffice is born out by his second methodological concern. 
The second and last methodological concern expressed in La 
volonte de savoir introduces Foucault's strategical model of power. 
Foucault claims that an analytics of power, more specifically the 
conceptual apparatus essential to an analytics of power, can be 
developed 'only on condition that it frees itself from a certain model 
ofpower that I would call..."juridico-discursive"' (HS1 109). The 
basic presupposition of the analytics of power is that although the 
nature of power has changed fundamentally in the last four hun-
dred years, the terms on which power is recognized and understood 
have not. Foucault argues that for certain historical reasons2 2 we 
moderns are enthralled by the 'juridico-discursive' model of power, 
and this originally medieval model is defined by four notions about 
power. First, power is essentially a matter of (moral) rule or (ju-
ridical) law that is applied to individuals, and that establishes binary 
standards, namely the moral/immoral and the legal/illegal, to cat-
egorize their behavior. Secondly, power is hierarchical, it is most 
concentrated at the top (in the President, Pope, CEO, et.al.) and 
diminishes as it reaches the bottom (in the citizens, laity, workers, 
et. al.). Thirdly, power is a tool to be used, and its use is typically 
negative; power represses, prohibits, controls, and punishes. Lastly, 
the juridical-discursive model contains a correlative notion of free-
dom; freedom is understood as escape, as the licit or illicit 
transgression of law and so freedom from its power. On the juridi-
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cal-discursive model, then, power is a manifestation of law that is 
applied from above to subjects who seek liberation from it. 
Foucault argues that the juridical-discursive model is both in-
adequate and pernicious. It is inadequate because it cannot identify, 
much less account for, distinctly modern phenomena of power. 
Modernity, in other words, has gradually been penetrated by new 
forms and mechanisms of power that are inexplicable and even 
imperceptible on the juridico-discursive model. This model is also 
doubly pernicious for reasons tied to its inadequacy. First, Fou-
cault contends that power is tolerable and successful only in 
proportion to its ability to hide its own mechanisms, and the juridico-
discursive model is pernicious because it fails to capture and so 
effectively hides the (more subtle, effective, and insidious) forms 
and mechanisms ofpower in modern society. In addition to hiding 
forms and mechanisms of power that dominate us, the juridico-
discursive model forestalls efforts to confront domination. The 
juridico-discursive model misinforms derivative models of domi-
nation making domination difficult to recognize, and even it 
recognized, resistance against domination is frustrated because the 
juridico-discursive model's attendant notion of freedom as escape 
misdirects efforts to end domination. Foucault aptly concludes his 
discussion of the juridico-discursive model of power by famously 
lamenting that we 'still have not beheaded the king' (HS I 117). 
Although we are still dominated by antiquated monarchical no-
tions about power, Foucault is about to raise the guillotine. 
In response to the inadequacy and perniciousness of the juridi-
cal-discursive model, Foucault articulates a 'strategical model' (HS1 
135) of power that is presupposed by and implicit in his analytics 
of power and genealogical critique (of punishment, sex, and ethi-
cal subjectivity) in Surveiller et punir and the Histoire de la 
sexualite. On this model, power is not a possession to be wielded 
or an economic principle to be regulated, nor is power centralized 
in institutions from which it is negatively exercised on the power-
less. Rather, for Foucault 'power' is an abbreviation for 'relations 
of power' (DE IV:719) and more specifically refers to 'a multiplic-
ity of [heterogeneous] force relations' (HS1 121). 
Foucault's concept ofpower is notoriously elusive, but I think 
it can be adequately captured by emphasizing five important points 
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which emerge in La volonte de savoir and in surrounding essays 
and interviews. The first point is that relations of power are 'local' 
and manifest in 'divisions, inequalities, and disequalibriums' (HS1 
124) within a vast and complex 'network' of roles. For Foucault, 
we are the totality of our roles—there is no human essence—and 
our roles are socially situated such that they are constituted by their 
relation to other roles. Power, then, is a purely relational phenom-
enon between individuals (in their roles) 2 3 and manifests wherever 
there is inequality in the extent to which the participants' roles are 
aligned with other roles, for power is deployed through these align-
ments which Foucault calls 'dispositifs.'24 
Two examples may be helpful here. To take an example close 
to Foucault, prison guards are in relations of power with prisoners 
because the role of the former is constituted by alignments with 
numerous other roles—warden, prison doctor, parole board mem-
ber, etc.—which as Foucault says 'swarm' the prisoners who lack 
such alignments. However, power is not a stable network because 
the alignments through which it is deployed are constantly shift-
ing. Feuding prisoners may collectively protest prison conditions, 
or prisoners whose crimes were once sensationalized by the media 
may enlist journalists to expose the brutal and corrupt warden. To 
take a contemporary political example, the U.S. President is in a 
relation of power with 'ordinary' citizens not because the former is 
sovereign and the latter are his subjects, but because the office or 
role of the President is aligned with a vast network of other roles— 
senators, federal agents, foreign diplomats, etc.—which swarm the 
citizen who lacks such alignments. Still, congresspeople may stage 
a 'republican coup' or journalists may publicize a scandalous af-
fair which prompts impeachment hearings. The juridico-discursive 
model of power, though, cannot adequately explain how 'the most 
powerful man in the free world' could come so close to being re-
moved from his elected office because of consensual sex acts. 
The second point, which follows from the first, is that power is 
not externally imposed on relationships, but is immanent in them. 
Power is not exercised on personal, occupational, economic, and 
political relations, but is already internal to them when and be-
cause power manifests in inequalities in the participants' personal, 
occupational, economic, and political roles. 
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The third point, which also follows from the first, is that ' power 
is everywhere ' (IISI 122). Foucault has been roundly criticized 
because this well-known but little understood remark is said to 
render the concept o fpower meaningless by reducing all relations 
to power. His general point, though, is that power is everywhere in 
the sense that 'power is coextensive with the social body ' (DE 
111:425). That is, human relations are everywhere, and all human 
relations are either relations of power or potentially relations of 
power. Thus, 'One is necessarily " ins ide" power, there is no "es -
caping" it* (HSl 126), because no relation can permanently exclude 
the divisions and inequalities in which power manifests. Further-
more, since power is a multiplicity of force relations, and since 
power is internal to human relations, the multiplicity of force rela-
tions corresponds to the multiplicity of (the divisions and inequities 
in) human relations. Consequently, power is at once everywhere 
and a multiplicity because its manifestations are dependent on (ubiq-
uitous and diverse) human relations. 
The fourth, more subtle point is that power reflects rational 
' s t r a t e g i e s ' (HSI 122) w h i c h a rc bo th ' i n t e n t i o n a l a n d 
nonsubject ive ' (HSI 124). Local force relations evince a strategy 
in the sense that they possess the same logic, share a common ' o b -
jec t ive ' and 'effect, ' and produce the same results. These strategies 
arc intentional, then, because they intend a discernible and charac-
teristic aim. However, Foucault insists that these strategies are not 
the result of individuals ' (conscious or unconscious) decis ions, 
which means that strategies are not conspiratorial: as he sarcasti-
cally remarks , there is no 'headquarters that presides over the 
rationality" of power (HSl 125). Rather, strategies of power are 
nonsubjective insofar as they arc anonymous and operate indepen-
dent ly of the part icular people who wil l ingly or unwi t t ing ly 
participate in them. For example, in Surveiller et punir Foucault 
argues thai prisoners, soldiers, and students are subject to complex 
bodily regimens which despite their vast differences exhibit a strat-
egy to produce 'docile bodies . 'This strategy is rational because it 
possesses a clear logic, intentional because its logic terminates in 
an intended effect, and nonsubjective because il is not the product 
of the crcator(s) of the regimens and operates independently of the 
particular prisoners, soldiers, and students who participate in them. 2 ' ' 
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The fifth and final point is that power is not merely repressive, 
but essentially productive. The juridico-discursive model under-
stands power as an instrument wielded against others such that the 
primary effect of power is to prohibit behavior and therefore re-
press individual or collective desire. But as Foucault recognizes, 
'power would be very fragile if its only function were to repress' 
(DE 11:757). Exclusively repressive power would be fragile sim-
ply because it could be easily recognized and directly confronted 
or covertly avoided. Foucault does not deny that power can be and 
is repressive, but he argues that power is essentially productive 
and derivatively repressive. That is, uniquely modern forms of 
power produce both (ethical and political) subjects who obey rules/ 
laws, and also their desires that power is said to repress. Hence, the 
notion of repression is 'insidious' (DZsIII: 148) because it blinds us 
to the fact that our subjection to the rule of law and our desires 
repressed by such subjection are actually the effects of power. 2 6 
According to Foucault's strategical model, power can thus be 
defined as a multiplicity of local and strategic force relations which 
are essentially productive. Importantly, this model does not dis-
card, but rather subsumes the juridico-discursive model of power. 
Foucault's model can account for juridical power and its repres-
sive effects as a subset of such relations. Moreover, the strategical 
model is superior to juridico-discursive model because it subsumes 
the latter, and because it can account for the productivity of power 
while the latter cannot. 
Foucault's strategical model of power, again which undergirds 
his analytics of power and his genealogical critique, is refined in 
three regards in 'The Subject and Power.'2 7 First, owing to a stron-
ger conception of the subject, Foucault distinguishes four kinds of 
local human relations: relations of power, capacity, communica-
tion, and violence. Most importantly, Foucault clarifies relations 
of power as only relations in which an individual or a collective of 
individuals acts to modify the possible conduct or actions of an-
other.28 Power 'is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon 
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or 
more difficult...it is...always a way of acting upon an acting sub-
ject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of 
action.' 2 9 This revised concept of power means not only that in-
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equality is a condition of power, but also that the degree of in-
equality corresponds to the effectiveness ofpower. Moreover, this 
refinement means that not all human relations are relations of power, 
and this is true of relations of capacity, communication, and even 
violence. 
Because relations of capacity are 'exerted over [inanimate 1 
things' in order to 'modify, use, consume, or destroy them,' 3 0rela-
tions of capacity do not modify human possibilities, and so are not 
relations ofpower. Relations of communication, on the other hand, 
are intersubjective linguistic or symbolic exchanges of informa-
tion, and while communication is a common element of relations 
of power, relations of communication are not necessarily relations 
of power. 
Foucault claims that relations of violence are also not relations 
ofpower; 'slavery,' he dramatically remarks, 'is not a power rela-
tionship when man is in chains.'3 1 This claim seems paradoxical 
because on the juridical-discursive model, power is a necessary 
condition for violence and the forcible restriction of freedom rep-
resents an act of violence. Foucault, however, opposes power with 
violence and this opposition turns on the presence or absence of 
freedom. Freedom for Foucault is the ability to realize one possi-
bility among many; freedom is 'a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comport-
ments may be realized.'32 As such, freedom is required by power 
and precluded by violence. Relations of power modify possibili-
ties, and so presuppose and require freedom understood as a field 
of possibilities. Freedom, Foucault says, 'is the condition for the 
exercise of power,' and so 'must exist for power to be exerted.' 3 3 
Relations of violence, on the other hand, are defined by the ab-
sence of freedom, that is, by the elimination of possibilities, and so 
are not relations of power. 'A relationship of violence,' Foucault 
claims, 'acts upon a body or things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on 
the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its 
opposite pole can only be passivity.'34 
Foucault's second refinement of his concept of power on the 
strategical model concerns the body. According to Foucault, power 
is corporal—power is inscribed on and invested in the body. 'Noth-
ing,' he says in a 1975 interview, 'is more material, physical, 
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corporal than the exercise of power' (DE 111:756). However, in 
light of Foucault's more recent distinction between relations of 
power and relations of violence, it is clear that power does not act 
directly on the flesh; relations of power which act directly on the 
body as flesh, say physical coercion, eliminate freedom and there-
fore become relations of violence. So, for example, in Sitr\>eiller et 
punir the ghastly torture and execution of Damiens in 1757 for 
regicide is an exercise of violence, not power (SP 9-11). 3 5 
One of Foucault's central theses is that the kind of brute vio-
lence exemplified by Damiens and characteristic of the Classical 
Age (1600-1800) has been replaced by modern relations of power 
which act indirectly and subtly on the body, but are even more 
effective (and insidious) because of it. Despite not acting directly 
on the flesh, 'power relations exert an immediate hold the body' 
(SP 30). Power seeks to control and transform the body, and does 
so by meticulously manipulating and training its operations; pre-
cise schedules regulate the temporal movement of the body, strategic 
architecture regulates the spatial position of the body, and norms 
reinforced by surveillance regulate the conduct and constitution of 
the body. Moreover, different kinds of power and their mechanisms 
act on the body to produce or control new subjects for different but 
consistent purposes. So, for example: in Surveiller et punir, (disci-
plinary) power produces 'docile' bodies trained for economic 
utility36; in the La volonte de savoir (bio-)power medicalizes the 
body, normalizes sexual pleasure, and produces repressed subjects 
for the purpose of regulating the demographics of populations; in 
his essays on 'Governmentality'37 and 'Political Technologies,' 3 8 
(pastoral) power polices the entire body politic of docile and re-
pressed subjects in the name of their own health, well-being, and 
security; and in L usage des plaisirs and Le souci de soi various 
'techniques of the self applied to the body produce ethical sub-
jects. In a word, then, power does no violence to the body, but does 
discipline, train, normalize, and surveil the body in a strategical 
attempt to control and modify it. 
The third and final important refinement of Foucault's strate-
gical model of power concerns resistance and domination. In La 
volonte de savoir, Foucault remarks that 'where there is power, 
there is resistance' (HS1 125). This claims, too, seems paradoxical 
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because on the juridico-discursive model, power and resistance are 
inversely proportional such that the exercise of power occludes 
resistance. In The Subject and Power,' however, Foucault clari-
fies the relationship between power and resistance. Power, again, 
establishes possibilities (as possibilities) and modifies or influences 
one possibility against others, and resistance refers not to deliber-
ately subversive activity, but to the counter-force exerted against 
power in virtue of possessing possibilities (which may include sub-
versive activity) other than that which power seeks to realize. Power, 
in other words, necessarily encounters resistance; if power does 
not encounter resistance, there is no freedom, and the relation be-
comes one of violence. In this sense, Foucault refers to the 
relationship between power and resistance as 'an agonism,' 3 9 and 
in this agon waged on a field of freedom, multiple forms of power 
encounter multiple forms of resistance and both develop strate-
gies. 
Foucault is patently not opposed to power per se, but to domi-
nation. He insists that 'power is not evil' (DE IV:727). Power is an 
obdurate, ineluctable element of human existence which makes no 
sense to oppose, and since power saturates human life, opposition 
to power necessarily implies and perpetuates power. However, 
Foucault is opposed to certain forms of power that dominate hu-
mans. In contrast to violence which eliminates freedom and 
resistance, domination effectively limits freedom and similarly neu-
tralizes resistance. Domination, in other words, is a form of power 
characterized by two features. First, while power generally works 
to occasion one possibility against others, domination significantly 
abridges the set of possibilities such that freedom is effectively 
limited.4 0 Secondly, since domination does not eradicate freedom, 
resistance is necessarily present in relations of domination, but this 
resistance is effectively neutralized. Domination achieves both, 
Foucault argues in 'The Subject and Power,' because it success-
fully globalizes local relations and strategies of power. That is, 
domination limits freedom and neutralizes resistance by gradually 
universalizing once local relations and strategies of power 4 1 so that 
certain possibilities are eliminated or marginalized, new possibili-
ties are precluded, and certain other possibilities become ostensible 
necessities.4 2 Further, from Foucault's concept of domination it 
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follows that domination can be identified and so confronted only 
by considering both the genesis of local relations and strategies of 
power, and also their historical development into domination. Here 
is the raison d'etre of genealogy. Liberation from power is neither 
desirable nor even possible, but freedom as a practice of exposing 
domination is. Foucault's genealogy is itself an ethical and politi-
cal practice, a practice of ethical and political critique of domination. 
Before we examine genealogical critique in the next section, 
one final issue about power remains: power/knowledge. Accord-
ing to Foucault power and knowledge form a dyad, and although I 
can't go into the details of this complicated relationship here, a 
brief treatment of power/knowledge is crucial for rounding out 
Foucault's account of power and tying it to genealogical critique. 
Foucault's thesis about power/knowledge is not that power and 
knowledge are identical. As he muses in a 1983 interview, 'study-
ing their relation is precisely my problem; if the two were identical, 
I would not have to study their relation and I would be spared a lot 
of fatigue' (DE IV:455). Nor is Foucault simply elaborating the 
cliche that 'knowledge is power,' that information is an instrument 
to acquire power, though this is closer to the truth. His thesis, rather, 
is that knowledge [savoir] and power are dialectically related such 
that neither is possible without the other, and that both are impli-
cated in domination. 
According to Foucault, the modern human sciences—psychia-
try, physiology, economics, and criminology, among 
others—developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From 
their inception, these sciences sought new kinds of extremely de-
tailed knowledge [connaissance] in the name of understanding 
certain dangerous populations, whether the insane, the sick, the 
criminal, the vagabond, or the sexual deviant. The accumulation 
of such knowledge, however, required new institutions such as asy-
lums, hospitals, and prisons, and new practices such as involuntary 
confinement, medical experimentation, surveillance, and psychi-
atric confession. Foucault's point, in other words, is that the 
humanistic and ostensibly humanitarian acquisition of scientific 
knowledge was greatly facilitated by new forms of power and new 
mechanisms of social control. These forms and mechanisms were 
then refined in order to acquire more extensive knowledge, which 
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in turn made possible even more precise techniques of control.4 3 
For our purposes, there are three salient features of Foucault's 
account of power/knowledge. First, the techniques of power and 
knowledge that were originally localized to specific (dangerous) 
populations have in the last two or three centuries been expanded 
and applied to the entire general population. Secondly, the discourse 
of the human sciences has become the dominant, legitimating dis-
course of our time. Lastly, this discourse is performative; it 
institutionalizes the discursive objects, the kinds of knowledge, the 
practices, and the forms of power which are constitutive of the 
human sciences, and which have produced new, thoroughly nor-
malized subjects. Thus, science and all that it implies is the initial 
object of Foucault's genealogical critique; genealogy targets 'the 
institutions and effects of the knowledge and power of scientific 
discourse' (DE III: 169). 
4. Foucauldian Genealogical Critique 
Foucault's remarks on genealogical critique are hopelessly dis-
persed throughout his entire corpus of books, essays, lectures, and 
interviews. Still, I believe that the crucial texts on critique are the 
1976 lectures, 'Qu'est-ce que la critique?,' and 'Qu'est-ce que les 
Lumieres?' Further, these three works reflect two stages in 
Foucault's conception of the significance of genealogical critique. 
In the 1976 lectures genealogy investigates the role ofpower in the 
relationship between forgotten or marginalized practices and domi-
nant practices, and is critical insofar as this investigation 
problematizes the latter. 'What is Critique' amounts to a geneal-
ogy of critique, and serves as a transitional work to the second 
stage of Foucault's conception of the significance of genealogical 
critique expressed in 'What is Enlightenment?' Here Foucault re-
interprets a forgotten notion of critique as an attitude or ethos, and 
in so doing counters the objections of Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer. 
In the first of the 1976 lectures Foucault discusses genealogi-
cal critique as 'an insurrection of "subjugated knowledges" [savoirs 
assujettisY (DE 111:163), and defines subjugated knowledges by 
distinguishing two kinds of subjugated knowledges: 'erudite' and 
'disqualified' subjugated knowledges. On one hand, erudite subju-
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gated knowledges refer to scholarly knowledge of historical dis-
courses, practices, and forms of life which have been obscured by 
the hegemonic tendencies of modern scientific discourse and insti-
tutions. As Foucault puts it, erudite subjugated knowledges refer 
to 'the historical contents that have been buried and masked in a 
functionalist coherence or formal systematization' (DE 111:164). 
On the other hand, disqualified subjugated knowledges refer to 
contemporary individuals' knowledge of discourses, practices, and 
forms of life which have been invalidated by the standards of domi-
nant discourses and institutions. Disqualified subjugated 
knowledges refer to 'a whole series of knowledges that have been 
disqualified as insufficiently conceptual or insufficiently elaborated; 
naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges 
beneath the required level of seriousness or the necessities of sci-
ence' (DE III: 164). And, while erudite and disqualified knowledges 
are not mutually exclusive, they are both in fact concerned with 
'historical knowledge of struggles' (DE 111:165). Subjugated 
knowledges are concerned with knowledge of the conflict between 
marginal and dominant discourses, practices, and forms of life. Put 
crudely, then, subjugated knowledges are forgotten or marginal 
discourses and practices under the 'tyranny' of modern science, 
especially the human sciences. 
Foucault argues that genealogy is the instrument of the insur-
rection of subjugated knowledges. Genealogy, he claims, is 'the 
union of erudite knowledges and local memories, a union which 
permits us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to 
use this knowledge tactically in the present' (DE III: 165). Geneal-
ogy investigates specific practices such as punishment and sex, 
and yields erudite and disqualified subjugated knowledge not 
merely of those practices but also of the discourses, practices, in-
stitutions, and forms of life that surround them. Genealogy, then, 
uncovers subjugated knowledges; genealogy exposes marginalized 
and/or forgotten discourses and practices. However, genealogy also 
recovers them insofar as they are used to problematize dominant 
practices and institutions. Genealogical knowledge of subjugated 
knowledges undermines dominant practices and institutions—their 
presuppositions, categories, concepts, and logic—by exposing the 
relations of power and historical contingencies behind their pre-
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tenses of universality, necessity, and nobility. Such destabilization, 
Foucault claims, then releases subjugated knowledges as genuine 
alternatives to dominant practices, institutions, and forms of life, 
and creates the freedom with which new ones can be explored. In 
short, genealogy is critical in the sense that it confronts the author-
ity of dominant practices and institutions, multiplies possibilities 
they effectively excluded, and thereby enhances freedom. 
Examples of this first stage of genealogical critique are found 
in both Surveiller etpunir and the Histoire de la sexualite. In these 
works Foucault charts the workings of power in the development 
of two important Western practices, punishment and sex, in an at-
tempt to demonstrate how the modern forms of punishment and 
sex have come about, and how (the sciences of) punishment and 
sex have been deployed as practices to subject humans. This dem-
onstration repudiates the ostensible necessity of modern 
understandings of these practices, releases subjugated knowledges 
of punishment and sex, and challenges modern forms of punish-
ment and sex directly by implicating them as mechanisms of 
subjection. 
Foucault describes Surveiller et punir as 'a genealogy of the 
present scientific-juridical complex from which the power to pun-
ish derives its bases, justifications, and rules, from which it extends 
its effects, and by which it masks its extreme singularity' (SP 27). 
Surveiller et punir, in other words, is a genealogy of the domina-
tion perpetrated by modern juridical punishment and its social 
correlative, discipline. In the early nineteenth century, Foucault 
argues, three economies of punishment representing three tech-
nologies of power were in circulation: public torture and execution; 
utilitarian prevention and deterrence; and penitentiary imprison-
ment. The economy of penitentiary imprisonment has dominated 
the last two hundred years of penal history, and its triumph is coex-
tensive with the expansion of disciplinary power, with the 
proliferation of disciplinary techniques outside the penitentiary 
prison. Foucault's genealogy demonstrates that the modern peni-
tentiary prison is an institutional technique of coercion and an 
apparatus of knowledge (of criminals and delinquency) which pro-
duces normalized and productive 'docile' bodies, and which 
naturalizes disciplinary power outside the prison. The prison sys-
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tem, then, is not an a priori necessity that courageously protects 
society from criminals, but an instrument that subjects the general 
population by legitimating and perfecting the techniques of cor-
rectional, normalizing, social discipline. 'The emergence of the 
[penitentiary] prison marks the institutionalization of the power to 
punish' (SP 133), and with it the entrenchment of the power to 
discipline. 
A second example comes from La volonte de savoir, a book 
which most basically asks 'not why are we repressed, but rather 
why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment 
against our most recent past, against our present, and against our-
selves, that we are repressed?' (HSl 16). This first volume of 
Foucault's trilogy is a genealogy of sex since 1700, and challenges 
what he calls 'the repressive hypothesis,' the wide-spread view that 
the last three centuries of sex have suffered from puritanical re-
pression of sexual desire, and that more generally humans are 
essentially characterized by animalistic desires repressed by social 
standards and their internalization. Foucault's genealogy of the tech-
niques of power and the will to know behind the valorization of 
the discourse of sexual repression demonstrates that the relation-
ship between sex and power is not characterized by repression; 
rather, power has produced a multiplicity of discourses about sexu-
ality, but the idiom of these discourse is itself oppressive. 
Mechanisms of power operating in a variety of institutions—reli-
gion, medicine, education, psychiatry, criminal justice, etc.—have 
produced a variety of discourses about sex. This proliferation of 
sexual discourses has dramatically increased unorthodox sexuali-
ties (hence our age is actually less repressed than the late middle 
ages and early modernity), but because these sexual discourses are 
all in the idiom of a biology of reproduction or a medicine of sexu-
ality, sexuality is constituted not as a matter of sensual pleasure, 
but as a problem of truth. 
The standard governing the production of true discourses on 
sexuality is the confession: first-person narrative testimony to one-
self or others about not merely the occurrence of sexual acts, but 
also about the hidden and potentially dangerous biography of the 
confessor—the thoughts, images, desires, fears, fantasies, and socio-
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economics surrounding sexuality. This vast knowledge of sex 
yielded and authenticated by confession to one's physician or psy-
chiatrist became the object of scientia sexualis, the purpose of which 
is not to intensify sexual pleasure, but to amplify analytical knowl-
edge of sexuality. Sex, in other words, was covertly transformed 
into sexuality insofar as sexual acts were colonized by the classifi-
catory, normalizing sexuality of binary categories: normal/deviant, 
heterosexual/homosexual, masculine/feminine, liberated/repressed. 
Individuals as sexual beings became the objects of knowledge and 
administrative control—surveillance, regulation, and manipulation 
of sexuality were justified in the name of the science of public 
health—and the ubiquity of the language of repression obscures 
the dynamics of domination within the medicalization of the his-
torical formation of sexuality. 
Because the science of sexuality, along with its repressive hy-
pothesis and confessional practices, were born of the Christian 
hermeneutic of the self, Foucault is forced to examine pagan antiq-
uity for subjugated knowledges of sex and subjectivity. L usage 
des plaisirs and Le souci de soi provide a genealogy of the desiring 
subject in Greco-Roman antiquity, and attempt to show 'how in 
classical antiquity sexual activity and sexual pleasures were 
problematized through practices of the self, bringing into play the 
criteria of an "aesthetics of existence'" (HS2 18). Foucault's ge-
nealogical inquiry reveals that ancient sexuality (aphwdisia) was 
not problematized in our modern Christian/scientific terms of de-
sire and its repression. Rather, between classical Greece and the 
early Roman Empire sexual activity and sexual pleasures were 
problematized in terms of the arts or aesthetics of existence: the 
existential style of intentional and voluntary techniques or austere 
practices of the self by which individuals transformed themselves 
into ethical subjects of sexual conduct. As Foucault puts it, the 
aesthetics of existence refer to 'those intentional and voluntary 
actions by which men not only fix themselves rules of conduct, but 
also seek to transform themselves, to modify themselves in their 
singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries 
certain aesthetic values and meets certain criteria of style' (HS2 
16-17). 
The modern problematization of sex in terms of sexual desire/ 
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repression lies at the heart of the seien tia sexual is and has indeed 
dominated the West for the past eighteen centuries. However, 
Foucault's genealogy of ancient sex as an insurrection of subju-
gated knowledge of the aesthetics of existence and its techniques 
of the self challenges this monolith. Sex for the Greeks and early 
Romans was an aesthetic matter, a matter of an individual's life-
style, and sexual discretion and moderation were exercised in the 
name of freedom as an ethical ideal. The asceticism, compulsion, 
and guilt which essentially characterize modern sexual practices 
and ethics—our sexual practices and ethics—were unknown to the 
ancients. As Foucault puts it, Greco-Roman 'themes of sexual aus-
terity should be understood, not as an expression of or commentary 
on deep and essential prohibitions, but as the elaboration and styl-
ization of an activity in the exercise of its power and the practice of 
its freedom' (HS2 30). Furthermore, Foucault identifies several 
specific ethical techniques of the self, for example Socratic 
parrhesia (truth-telling) and Stoic premeditatio malorum (medita-
tion on future tragedies) intended to constitute an aesthetics of 
existence. And while a return to ancient sexuality is neither desir-
able nor even possible, 4 4 by demonstrating the emergence of the 
Christian problematization of sex from its pagan antecedent, he 
undermines the unquestioned authority, legitimacy, and self-cer-
tainty of modern sexuality and its scientific discourse of repression. 
In sum, Foucauldian genealogy at this stage is critical in two 
regards. First, it undermines dominant practices and institutions 
by exposing the relations of power that have generated them and 
that operate through them. Secondly, and more radically, it impli-
cates practices and institutions as mechanisms of domination; it 
shows that power relations operating through dominant practices 
and institutions not only oppress subjects, but in fact constitute 
them in precise ways for specific purposes. Foucauldian geneal-
ogy, then, is critical not in the conventional sense of specifying 
first principles in order to denounce what is and make prescrip-
tions for what should be, but in the sense that it confronts domination 
by identifying and explaining its mechanisms and tactics in the 
name of freedom. 'Things that have been made,' Foucault argues, 
'can be unmade on condition that we how it was that they were 
made' (DE I V:449). Genealogy explains how things—practices and 
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subjects alike—were made, and so 'is absolutely indispensable for 
any transformation' (DE IV: 180) of those practices and of ourselves. 
In 1978 Foucault delivered an important lecture at the Sorbonne 
entitled 'Qu'est-ce que la critique?'45 This lecture is in effect a 
genealogical critique of critique, and serves as a transitional work 
to the second stage in his conception of the significance of genea-
logical critique expressed most thoroughly in 'Qu'est-ce que les 
Lumieres?' According to Foucault's genealogy, modern critique 
was originally not a specific method or procedure but an attitude 
or ethos which he sees reflected in Kant's 'Was ist Aufklärung?' 
and which he reinterprets in his essay of the same title. 
In 'What is Critique?' Foucault argues that critique was born 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in response to 
governmentalization, that is, in response to the politicization of the 
Christian pastoral. The Christian pastoral refers to the idea that all 
individuals from birth to death ought to be governed toward their 
salvation by someone to whom they are totally obedient. In the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this pastoral was expanded from a 
church doctrine into the art of governing civil society, focusing on 
the methods and objectives of governing the health, well-being, 
and development of various elements of civil society, for example 
one's own mind, one's own body, a house, children, the poor, armies, 
and so on. Governmentalization, however, prominently raised the 
question of how not to be governed, meaning not how to avoid 
being governed altogether, but how to be governed better, how not 
to be governed like one was being governed. This perpetual and 
pervasive question manifested in what Foucault calls 'the critical 
attitude.'As he initially characterizes it, the critical attitude is sim-
ply 'a general cultural form...a moral and political attitude [and] a 
way of thinking' about not being governed. 4 6 He later argues, 
though, that the critical attitude consists specifically of suspicion 
and scrutiny of the relationship between power, (theoretical) truth, 
and the subject; the critical attitude focuses on the legitimating 
truths to which the methods and objectives of those who governed 
subjects appealed, and questions the authority of those truths ac-
cording to several different standards, including that of the Bible, 
natural law, and one's own good judgment. Thus, Foucault defines 
the critical attitude as 'the movement through which the subject 
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gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects 
and to question power about its discourses of truth. Critique will 
be the art of voluntary inservitude, of reflective indocility.'47 More-
over, this definition 'differs little from the one Kant gave, not of 
critique, but precisely of.... Aufklärung'** 
In 1784 Kant asked in the Berlinische Monatschrift 'Was ist 
Aufklärung?' On its bicentennial, Foucault argues in 'Qu'est-ce 
que les Lumieres?' 4 9 that Kant's essay lies 'at the intersection 
[charniere] of critical reflection and reflection on history' {DE 
IV:568). Kant's essay reflects on the historical situation he inhab-
its, and locates the motive for his critical project in that situation. 
Of course, the historical situation in question is the Enlightenment, 
which Kant defines not as an historical period or an intellectual 
event, but as an 'Ausgang.' Enlightenment is a process and an ob-
ligation that releases us from our 'self-imposed immaturity,' our 
willful failure to use autonomous reason and our obedience to the 
authority of others where such reason is called for. Thus, on 
Foucault's reading, for Kant Enlightenment is 'defined by a modi-
fication of the preexisting relation between will, authority, and the 
use of reason' (DE IV:564), that is, between the subject, power, 
and truth. And, Kant's critical project is a response to Enlighten-
ment insofar as the use of autonomous reason requires that its limits 
be defined and its legitimate and illegitimate uses be determined. 
Further, once revealed religion and metaphysics are stripped of 
their authority, normative critique is justified on the universal, 
ahistorical grounds of reason; morality requires the private use of 
autonomous reason and being governed properly means promot-
ing the public use of autonomous reason. So, in sum, according to 
Foucault, Kant's understanding of Enlightenment reflects the criti-
cal attitude occasioned by governmentalization, and the latter's 
critical project is born of that attitude. 'What Kant described as 
Aufklärung is indeed what I...describe as critique, as that critical 
attitude one sees appear as a specific attitude in the West from... 
what was historically the great process of the governmentalization 
of society.' 5 0 
Foucault does not clarify the significance of the relationship 
between the historical and critical dimensions of Kant's essay, but 
1 believe that his revisionist reading intends or at least implies three 
points. First, as Christopher Norris has observed, Foucault sees an 
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unresolvable tension between these two dimensions.5' On one hand, 
highly specific historical conditions commit Kant to a particular 
project of critique, and on the other hand, that project of critique 
attempts to transcend those condition by deducing a priori truths 
about human faculties and establishing universal moral laws. Put 
more starkly, Kant mistakes historically specific truth-claims and 
limits for a priori and universally valid truth-claims and intrinsi-
cally human limits. The second, more important point is that the 
past two centuries of philosophical discourse have adopted the 
general form of Kant's notion and project of critique, valorizing 
foundations and universals, and demanding that epistemic and nor-
mative validity be justified on their terms in law-like fashion. The 
third and most important point is that Kant's notion and project of 
critique which frame the philosophical discourse of modernity are 
through and through juridical. Kantian critique is drawn on the 
juridico-discursive model of power, for in effect it translates both 
political sovereignty into epistemic and normative sovereignty, and 
also juridical laws into epistemic limits and moral laws. As we 
have seen, on the juridico-discursive model (political) power is 
embodied in the sovereign who makes laws and from above ap-
plies them in order to limit subjects and adjudicate their disputes. 
Analogously, Kantian reason is sovereign, it occupies a privileged 
position from which it identifies epistemic limits and moral laws, 
and from which it applies them in order to adjudicate competing 
truth-claims and actions. Moreover, Foucault's objection to the 
juridico-discursive model holds for the Kantian notion of critique 
it inspired; preoccupied with the privilege of sovereignty and law, 
the juridico-discursive model is blind to certain productive mo-
dalities and mechanisms of power, and the Kantian notion of critique 
is blind to how those modalities and mechanisms produce discur-
sive objects of knowledge and establish theoretical truth-conditions. 
In short, Foucault seeks to abandon the notion of (political, 
epistemic, and normative) sovereignty, and with it (Kantian) 
critique's claims to foundational truth and universal validity.5 2 
However, Foucault refuses to give in to 'the "blackmail" of 
the Enlightenment' (DE IV:571). That is, he refuses to abandon 
critique simply because he rejects the terms on which it has been 
defined since Kant. Nonetheless, Foucault recognizes that we are 
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still 'historically determined to a certain extent' (DE IV:572) by 
the Enlightenment, and so he seeks an alternative notion of cri-
tique within the Enlightenment tradition. He finds such an 
alternative in the critical attitude and in Kant's characterization of 
it as Enlightenment; insofar as he simultaneously problematizes 
both his relation to the present and the constitution of the autono-
mous subject, Kant illustrates the critical attitude of the 
Enlightenment despite the fact that he fatally dehistoricized his 
particular critical project inspired by it. In other words, Kant's age, 
like our own, witnessed the collapse of foundations, and while he 
exemplifies the critical attitude of Enlightenment which we too 
need, he pursued a misguided notion and project of critique 
regrounded in epistemology.5 3 Kant, then, weaves the philosophi-
cal thread that connects us with the Enlightenment, and this thread 
is not 'fidelity to elements of its doctrine, but rather the permanent 
reactivation of an attitude; that is, of a philosophical ethos that 
could be characterized as a permanent critique of our historical 
era' (DE IV:571). 
Critique for Foucault is an attitude or ethos, a philosophical 
life even, which problematizes the relationship between power, 
knowledge/truth, and the subject, and which investigates the his-
torical limits of what we are, think, say, and do, not in order to 
observe them, but to experimentally go beyond them. Critique he 
says 'is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal 
structures with universal value, but rather as an historical investi-
gation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and 
to recognize ourselves as subjects' (DE IV:574). And, genealogy is 
critical insofar as it is essential to this attitude; genealogy opposes 
dominant discourses, practices, and institutions by revealing the 
historical contingencies and relations of power/knowledge behind 
their ostensible necessity, and so creates the possibility of being, 
thinking, and doing beyond their limits. Finally, the critical atti-
tude is adopted in the name of freedom, for at stake is 'the 
disconnection of the growth of capabilities [capacites] from the 
intensification of power relations' (DE IV:576). In short, then, cri-
tique for Foucault amounts to identifying the limits that history 
and domination have placed on us, limits that we have placed on 
ourselves, and its task is not to escape from power, but to create the 
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possibility of untold possibilities. Whereas for Kant only freedom 
is required for Enlightenment, for Foucault the critical attitude of 
Enlightenment is required for freedom. 
5. Conclusion 
We are now in a position to formulate a response to the objec-
tions raised by Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer with which I began 
this paper. I believe that their collective objections reduce to two 
claims. First, Taylor claims that Foucault's critique of power is 
'incoherent' because the account of power presupposed by his cri-
tique rejects the correlative notions of freedom and truth without 
which the notion of power makes no sense. While Foucault's cri-
tique of power does presuppose a detailed account of power, this 
account does not reject the notions of freedom and truth, but rather 
reconceptualizes them. Taylor assumes that freedom is the absence 
of power, and since power is everywhere there can be no freedom. 
However, for Foucault freedom is in fact the condition of the op-
eration of power and he critiques not power per se but forms of 
power which effectively curtail freedom. In response to objections 
like Taylor's, Foucault rightly says that 'The idea that power is a 
system of domination which controls everything and leaves no place 
for freedom cannot be attributed to me' (DE IV:721). 
Foucault's reconceptualization of truth brings us to the second 
claim against him. Habermas and Walzer, and to a lesser extent 
Taylor too, claim that Foucault lacks a normative justification for 
critique insofar as his account of power precludes an epistemic 
standpoint outside power from which he can develop normative 
standards. This charge hangs on the twin hooks of the juridical-
discursive model of power and the Kantian tradition of critique, 
and represents a two-fold attempt to blackmail Foucault. First, 
Habermas and Walzer demand that Foucault adopt some position 
of epistemic sovereignty, and they assume that in the absence of 
such a position he cannot develop valid, that is universal, norma-
tive standards. Secondly, Habermas and Walzer insist that ethical 
critique requires universal normative standards, and they assume 
that in absence of those standards, Foucault is reduced to relativ-
ism or decisionism, and his critique collapses in on itself. 
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Foucault argues at length against both these assumptions. First, 
Foucault's genealogies of power/knowledge intend to undermine 
the very notion of epistemic sovereignty; there simply is no 
epistemic position external to and independent of power/knowl-
edge—no Biblical Truths, no metaphysical Truths, no Truths about 
Enlightenment human nature, Kantian reason, Freudian desire, or 
Habermasian communication. Nonetheless, Foucault remains com-
mitted to the notion of truth,54 but in what sense exactly? Briefly, I 
believe that he distinguishes three different kinds of truth: empiri-
cal truth, historical truth, and theoretical truth. The first two kinds 
of truth straightforwardly concern empirical and historical objects. 
So, for example, Foucault would say that it is true that the Louvre 
is located in Paris, and that Napoleon married Josdphine. How-
ever, the point of his 'politics of truth' is that theoretical truths, the 
truths of philosophy and the human sciences, are essentially vari-
able and contingent but not arbitrary because they have been 
established by identifiable historical strategies and mechanisms of 
power/knowledge. The very purpose of genealogy is to illuminate 
these strategies and mechanisms, and is critical to the extent that it 
reveals the complicity of ostensibly inescapable systems of truth 
in subtle forms of domination. And if we ask about the status of 
Foucault's historical claims and genealogical conclusions, they may 
be false, but they are not necessarily false simply because they are 
not formulated external to the regime of power/knowledge he is 
attempting to capture. In a word, then, Foucault renounces epistemic 
sovereignty, and along with it he denies the possibility and desir-
ability of universal normative standards. 
The second assumption made by Habermas and Walzer is that 
ethical critique is unjustified in the absence of universal normative 
standards. Foucault, though, will have none of this; the assump-
tion made by Habermas and Walzer trades on specific conceptions 
of critique and ethics which Foucault rejects. Habermas and Walzer 
understand critique as a procedural deduction of a damning con-
clusion from a major premise consisting of some universal 
normative principle, and from a minor premise about the relevant 
empirical or historical facts. On this view, critique is obviously 
unjustified in the absence of normative principles. As we have seen, 
though, Foucault critiques this very notion of critique. Critique for 
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Foucault is most generally an attitude of suspicion about limits, 
and essential to this attitude are genealogical inquiries which illus-
trate the relations ofpower and the historical contingencies behind 
ostensible limits. Foucault's genealogy of Habermas's and Walzer's 
notion of critique shows that it is a response to specific historical 
conditions, and that it embodies the pernicious model of power 
current to those conditions. 
Foucault also rejects the specific conception of ethics on which 
Habermas's and Walzer's assumption trades. For Habermas and 
Walzer, morality is a system of abstract principles to which ethics 
as a concrete social practice is subordinate. Foucault, though, dis-
putes such morality as an empty vestige of Christian codes 
entrenched by early modern governmentalization and its juridical-
discursive model of power. Moreover, at the conclusion of his final 
interview Foucault admitted what his life's work implied, that The 
search for a form of morality acceptable to everyone [le monde]— 
in the sense that everyone is obliged to submit to it—strikes me as 
catastrophic' (DE IV:706). 
Foucault does not discard morality altogether, but he does 
greatly minimize its significance by subordinating it to a 
reconceptualized notion of ethics drawn on pagan antiquity. Op-
posed to a science of biology, ethics for Foucault is an aesthetics of 
existence in which the subject performs techniques or activities on 
itself in an attempt to attain a certain stylized mode of being which 
in turn frames the self-government of thought and conduct. 
Foucault's ethics as an aesthetics of existence has been accused of 
being a dangerous postmodern advance and a quietist stoic retreat, 
but I think it is neither.55 For one, Foucault's ethics is not a facile 
postmodern dandysme; the techniques of the self which constitute 
ethics are not idiosyncratic novelties, but are performed in accor-
dance with shared or communal practices.56 These techniques are 
'not something invented by the individual himself. They are mod-
els that he finds in his culture and that are proposed, suggested, 
imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group' 
(DE IV:719). Further, Foucault's ethics is not stoic in the collo-
quial sense of being apathetically individualistic or so/ipsistic. 
Ethics as stylistic work on oneself is inseparable from social and 
political commitment because of the essentially communal nature 
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of the techniques through such work is performed. So while 'free-
dom is the ontological condition of ethics,...ethics is the considered 
[reflechie] form that freedom takes upon reflection' (DE IV:712). 
Freedom is a condition of ethics because ethics simply is a practice 
of freedom, and since the practices of freedom are intrinsically 
social, we have, Foucault thinks, all the reason we need to make 
political commitments based on normative judgments. In short, 
then, Foucault's ethics does not provide a menu of values, a formal 
decision procedure, or a specific political program; but, in a nor-
malized world without foundational truths, universal standards, or 
a pure subject, it does provide an Ausgang in the form of a novel 
framework for opposing forms of violence which eliminate free-
dom, forms of domination which occlude freedom, and forms of 
power which militate against freedom. 'The freedom of the sub-
ject and its relationship to others... constitutes the heart [matiere] 
of ethics' (DE IV:729). 
NOTES 
1 Several important commentators on Foucault deny that his geneal-
ogy is critical (though this denial takes many forms), and in fact the 
received view is that Foucauldian genealogy is not critical. In addition to 
Habermas, Taylor, and Walzer, for example, Nancy Fraser (1981), Tho-
mas McCarthy (1990), and Richard Rorty (1986) also argue that 
Foucauldian genealogy is not critical. I have chosen to address Habermas, 
Taylor, and Walzer simply because their views on Foucauldian genea-
logical critique are the most representative and have been the most 
influential. Defenses of Foucauldian genealogical critique can be found 
in John Rajchman (1985) and John S. Ransom (1997). 
2 Habermas 1985: 292. 
3 Habermas begins this eulogy by relating what impressed him most 
about Foucault upon their first meeting in 1983: 'the tension, which re-
sists easy categorization, between the almost serene scientific reserve of 
the scholar striving for objectivity on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
political vitality of the vulnerable, subjectively excitable, morally sensi-
tive intellectual' (1986: 103). 
4 Habermas 1985: 279-343. 'Vernunftkritische Entlarvung der 
Humanwissenschaften: Foucault' and lAporien einer Machttheorie.' 
5 Habermas 1986: 108. 
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6 Habermas 1985: 325. 
7 Ibid., p. 336. 
« Taylor 1986: 69. 
y Idem. 
™ Ibid., p. 70. 
11 Ibid., p. 91. 
' 2 / t a / . , p . 93. 
13/&/</., p. 83. 
'•»Walzer 1986:64. 
'5 Wem. 
'6/&/</., p. 62. 
, 7/W</.,p.61. 
1 8 These lectures were transcribed and first published in Italian trans-
lation in 1977 (Microfiscia del Potere: interventi politici, edited by A. 
Fontana and P. Pasquino, pp. 163-194. Torino: Einuadi). They did not 
appear in French until 1994, a decade after Foucault's death, as 'Cours du 
7 Janvier 1976' and 'Cours du 14 Janvier 1976' in DE 111:160-189. 
'-> Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 184. 
2 0 The conceptual relationship between these parts is the reverse of 
their chronological relationship. Conceptually, a model of power raises 
certain methodological concerns which then guide an analytics of power. 
Chronologically, though, Foucault performed an analytics of disciplinary 
power in Surveiller et punir (1975) and raised certain methodological 
concerns in the 1976 lectures. Then, in La volonte de savoir (December 
1976) he clarified his methodological concerns, conducted an analytics 
of bio-power, and articulated a model of power which he later refined in 
'The Subject and Power' (1983). This model, however, is presupposed by 
and implicit in Surveiller et punir, La volonte de savoir, L'usage des 
plaisirs (1984) and Le souci de soi (1984). The conceptual-chronological 
inversion is understandable, for it simply means that Foucault's practice 
of power antedated and exceeded his ability to theorize that practice. 
2 1 cf. 'Le pouvoir, ca n'existe pas.' (DE 111:302). Power, in other 
words, is not a substantive. 
2 2 Foucault enumerates these reasons in the 'Cours du 14 Janvier 
1976' (DE 111:185) and briefly returns to them in La volonte de savoir 
(HS1 114-118). The basic reason is that during the Middle Ages systems 
of law were essential to the establishment of the great monarchies. Ever 
since then, law and power have been correlated, and this correlation forms 
the heart of the juridico-discursive model. 
2 3 It may be objected that we participate in relations of power with 
groups and with ourselves. Foucault's response to the former objection is 
that groups such as our 'family' and the 'government' are mere abstrac-
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tions that designate the roles of the individuals with whom we are in 
relations of power. As for the second objection, in L'usage des plaisirs 
and Le souci de soi Foucault has a richer notion of subjectivity less tied to 
roles, and expands relations of power to include relations between the 
subject and itself. Still, relations of power between the subject and itself 
are complicated by performative contradictions between the subject's vari-
ous roles. For example, in the former work he argues that Greek men 
experienced a contradiction as pederasts who subjected boys to their sexual 
will, and as citizens in a polis responsible for educating and cultivating 
the independence of future citizens (HS2 205-248). 
2 4 From the mid-1970's on, Foucault became increasingly concerned 
with both being a very public intellectual, and with discussing the proper 
function of public intellectuals. I believe that his considerable efforts to 
promote himself were not motivated (at least solely) by an interest in 
celebrity, but by his awareness of the extensive alignments entailed by 
such a role. cf. 'The role of the intellectual, precisely since he works in 
the realm of though, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make 
transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and 
difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality' 
(DE IV: 181). More generally, see 'Le souci de la verite' ((1984), DE 
IV668-678). 
2 5 cf. 'People know what they do; they frequently know why they do 
what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does' (per-
sonal communication to Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 187). 
2 6 If the operation of power requires inequalities, and if power pro-
duces (ethical and political) subjects who obey rules and laws, it follows 
that inequalities are necessary for the operation of juridical systems. Put 
more starkly, inequality is a requirement of the institutions central to lib-
eral political theory, cf. '...it is one of the fundamental traits of Western 
societies that the force relations which for a long time were expressed in 
war, in every form of war, gradually became invested in the order of 
political power' (HSl 135). 
2 7 Foucault wrote this essay in 1983 specifically for Dreyfus and 
Rabinow's book. Moreover, he wrote the first part of the essay, 'Why 
Study Power: The Question of the Subject,' in English, although the sec-
ond part, 'How is Power exercised?,' is translated from French by Leslie 
Sawyer. 
2 X cf. 'in human relationships—whether they involve verbal 
communication...or amorous, institutional, or economic relationships— 
power is always present: I mean a relationship in which one person tries 
to control [dinger] the conduct of the other' (DE IV:720). 
2 9 Foucault 1983: 220. 
-TO/Wrf.,p.217. 
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31 Ibid.,?. 221. 
3 2 Idem 
33 Idem. 
™Ibid., p. 220. 
3 5 However, this act of violence is a mechanism in power relations— 
the violence against Damiens reestablishes the sovereign's political 
authority. 
3 6 In the 1976 lectures Foucault claims that disciplinary power is 
'one of the greatest inventions of bourgeois society' (DE 111:186). 
3 7 See 'la 'gouvernmentalite'" ((1978), DE 111:635-657). 
3 8 See '"Omnes et singulatim:"' vers une critique de la raison 
politique" ((1981), DE IV: 134-161). Foucault summarizes pastoral power 
in 'The Subject and Power' (1983: 213-216). 
3 9 Foucault 1983: 222-223. 
4 0 cf. 'Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great 
number of cases, relations ofpower are fixed in such a way that they are 
perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of free-
dom' (DE IV:720). 
4 1 cf. Strategies of power 'were invented and organized from the 
starting points of local conditions and particular needs. They developed 
piece by piece, prior to any class strategy designed to solidify them into 
vast coherent ensembles' (DE 111:202). 
4 2 cf. 'AH my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in 
human existence'(Foucault 1988: 11). 
4 3 Foucault's more general philosophical point is that nothing can be 
recognized as knowledge if it does not conform to rules characteristic of 
some kind of 'serious' (scientific) discourse, and if it does not possess 
effects of coercion proper to what is valid on that discourse. Inversely, 
nothing can function as a mechanism ofpower if it is not exerted accord-
ing to procedures and objectives that are valid in coherent systems of 
knowledge composed of 'serious' discourses. 
4 4 Paul Veyne, a close friend of Foucault and one of the most influen-
tial French commentators on his work, insists that 'Foucault never thought 
he saw an alternative to the Christian ethic in the Greeks' sexual ethic' 
(1997: 226). 
4 5 This lecture is not included in Dits et ecrits, so I have relied on the 
only available copy, an English translation by Kevin Paul Geiman in What 
is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century 
Questions, edited by J. Schmidt, pp. 382-398. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996. 
4 6 Foucault 1996: 384. 
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•« Ibid., p. 386. 
4» Idem. 
4 9 'Qu'est-ce que les Lumieres?' is one of Foucault's last essays writ-
ten and first published (in English translation) in 1984. (The Foucault 
Reader, edited by P. Rabinow, pp. 32-50. New York: Pantheon). This es-
say also did not appear in French until 1994 in DE IV:562-578. 
5" Foucault 1996: 386-387. 
5' Norris 1994: 168-169. 
5 2 Glimpses of Foucault's mature notion of critique can be seen as 
early as 1978. cf. 'Critique does not have to be the premise of a deduction 
which concludes: this is what needs to be done. It should be an instru-
ment for those who fight, resist, and refuse what is. It's use should be in 
processes of conflict, confrontations, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to 
lay down the law for the law. It is not a stage in a program. It is a chal-
lenge in relation to what is' (DE IV:32). 
5 3 Still, Foucault recognizes that Kantian philosophizing and critique 
have 'not been without [their] importance or effectiveness during the last 
two centuries' (DE IV:577). 
5 4 cf. 'I believe too much in truth not to suppose that there are differ-
ent truths and different ways to speak about the truth' (DE IV:733). 
5 5 The former accusation is made by Pierre Hadot (1989: 267) and 
the latter accusation is made by Richard Wolin (1986: 84-85). 
5 6 Of course, to the extent that our culture may be postmodern these 
techniques themselves may be postmodern. 
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